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I. INTRODUCTION
The question regarding the legal status of the embryo hinges around a more 
conceptual —or, rather, more fundamental— legal distinction, namely, the distinction 
between “things” and “persons.” What is involved here is determining whether embry-
onic human life is personal life and, thus, whether the embryo has rights, or whether is 
it just the object of somebody else´s rights.  
This radical discussion becomes apparent in other more technical and concrete 
debates  about the relationship between the value of human life and its stage of bi-
ological development, or its viability perspectives1.  The claim that the legal value of 
embryonic life depends upon its stage of development and its viability perspectives is, 
as shall be discussed later, one of the main arguments in favor of the right to abortion in 
American constitutional case law and, extensively, in favor of the right–and sometimes 
duty–to discard embryos. This claim is grounded, at least, on two normative proposi-
tions. According to the first one, constitutional norms would admit the existence of 
legal personhood only after birth; and/or would make the legal value of non-personal 
unborn life depend on its viability. The second proposition states that, in the light of 
the un-personhood of the embryo, the constitutional principle of equality would not 
be applicable to them. 
As shall be described, Argentine constitutional case law rejects—with some ex-
ceptions—those distinctions based upon the contrary normative premises, according 
to which constitutional principles admit the personal quality in each and every human 
being from the time of conception, which is, in turn, set at the moment of fertilization. 
On this basis, it is understood that these same norms would recognize equal dignity 
in every person and would proscribe making the legal value of human life–which is 
always the life of a person–depend on the stage of development or on the (chances of ) 
viability inside or outside the mother´s womb.
1  In statutory law, this claim has been performed by means of the much discussed conceptual distinction 
between embryos and “pre-embryos” as can be seen, for example, in Spanish legislation concerning 
the donation and use of embryos (Ley No. 42,1988) for therapeutic or scientific research use, and the Law 
concerning assisted reproduction (Ley No. 35, 1988). For a critical review of the ethical and legal implications 
of this conceptual distinction in American Constitutional Law, see, e.g., VINCINGUERRA, Joshua S. Showing 
“Special Respect” – Permitting the Gestation of Abandoned Preembryos. Albany Law Journal of Science & 
Technology, Albany, v. 9, p. 399-422, 1999. p. 405; and more recently STENGER, Robert. Embryos, Fetuses and 
Babies: Treated as Persons and Treated with Respect, Journal of Health & Biomedical Law, Boston, v.2, n.1, p. 
33-67, 2006. p.33.
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Two mutually complementary analyses will be examined in the next paragraphs. 
An Argentine and U.S. case law review will be carried out in order to infer the arguments 
that have been posed in both constitutional practices regarding the acceptance or re-
jection of those conceptual distinctions (sections II & III). 
This comparative approach is justified by the fact that, as it has been insistently 
pointed out by various ius-philosophical schools of thought, the abstract nature of con-
stitutional language is an open door to political, ethical, and philosophical assessments 
or, in Rawlsian terms, to the “comprehensive conceptions” of those who interpret and 
adjudicate law. In this light, although the arguments for legal protection of embryonic 
life and the counterarguments for a lack of legal protection of embryonic life arise in dif-
ferent normative contexts, the creative nature of constitutional interpretation justifies 
the comparative approach propounded in this review. 
However, there is more to constitutional interpretation than mere creativity. In 
order to be framed within a particular legal practice, legal interpretation should confine 
itself to two kinds of requirements. On the one hand, it should be coherent with the 
values, goods or ends that should be common to all legal practices in order to distin-
guish themselves from sheer violence2. On the other hand, legal interpretation should 
conform to the way that the particular legal practice within which it finds itself deter-
mines those common values, goods or ends which are common to all legal practices. 
This means that it should take into account the semantic and syntactic rules that apply 
to the legal statements under interpretation.
Creativity in interpretation operates, accordingly, within the framework of two 
margins: the teleological one and the linguistic or, more generally, the semantic one. 
These restrictions to interpretative creativity also set logical limits to the transposition 
of arguments from one constitutional practice, such as that of the U.S., to another, such 
as that of Argentina. Therefore, the benefit of the proposed comparative analysis will 
2 See ZAMBRANO, Pilar. La inevitable creatividad en la interpretación jurídica una aproximación 
iusfilosófica a la tesis de la discrecionalidad. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2009. Among 
the many authors who agree on the description of interpretation as a comprehensive task which includes a 
creative dimension, not to be confused with unrestricted discretion, see DWORKIN, Ronald.  Taking Rights 
Seriously. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1977. Chapters. I-IV; DWORKIN, Ronald. A Matter of Principle. 
Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1985. Chapters. I-VI; DWORKIN, Ronald. Law’s Empire. Cambridge: 
Havard University Press, 1986. p. 65-68; 411-413; DWORKIN, Ronald. Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1996. p.10; DWORKIN, Ronald. Justice in Robes. 
Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2006. p. 18-21. For a critical review in Spanish language of Dworkin´s 
proposal, see ZAMBRANO, Pilar. Objetividad en la interpretacion judicial y objetividad en el Derecho. Una 
reflexion a partir de las luces y sombras en la propuesta de Ronald Dworkin. Persona y Derecho, n. 56, p. 281-
326, 2007; and ZAMBRANO, Pilar. La inevitable creatividad en la interpretación jurídica una aproximación 
iusfilosófica a la tesis de la discrecionalidad. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2009. p. 37-53. 
The most relevant author insisting on the possible synthesis of creativity and objectivity in interpretation, 
outside the English language field, is perhaps ALEXY, Robert. A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory 
of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification. Transalated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989. p.17.    
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depend upon the adequacy of the questions that are posed. With these restrictions in 
mind, the questions that this comparative study aims to answer are: 
(a) Which is the justificatory or teleological perspective of interpretation as-
sumed or postulated in each of these case law practices? (section IV. B(1))  
(b) Which is the semantic theory underlining the whole interpretative process in 
each of these case law practices? (section IV. B(2))
(c) Which of these teleological and semantic postulates best fit the final aims or 
values of constitutional law? (section V)
In the end, we aim to reflect upon the reciprocal influence between these two 
margins of interpretation. Particularly, we intend to test the coherence between, on the 
one side, the claim that fundamental rights are deontological and, on the other, the 
assumption of a constructive or criterial semantic theory of language in the interpreta-
tion of the concept of legal personhood (section V). 
II. THE EMBRYO IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW 
Although the status of the embryo is not regulated by federal statutory law, 
it may be induced from the federal Supreme Court decisions concerning the issue of 
abortion that, as a whole, establish the legal status of the unborn in its various gesta-
tional stages. The leading cases in this line are the well-known Roe v. Wade3 and Casey4.
 A. The Value of the Embryo´s Life under Roe v. Wade  
The famous case of Roe v. Wade, argued before the United States Supreme Court, 
challenged a Texas criminal abortion statute which penalized abortions in all cases, ex-
cept when pregnancy meant a risk to the life of the mother.
The District Court found the Texas Act unconstitutional in the light of the 9th 
Amendment, which admits implicit rights stemming from in the U.S. Constitution, but 
denied the injunction that would have allowed Roe to benefit from this unconstitu-
tionality. Roe filed for an appeal to have the original decision upheld, and to obtain the 
injunction5. 
The Supreme Court analyzed Roe´s claim in the light of the fundamental right 
to privacy, a right that, even if not explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, had 
been recognized by the Court in previous cases as a necessary dimension of other lib-
erty rights that were explicitly recognized6. The Court, then, had to decide whether 
the choice to abort was one of the dimensions of that fundamental right or preferred 
3  Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
4  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US 833 (1992).
5  Roe v. Wade, 410 US at 122.
6  Id. at 153-55.
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freedom, what its extent was, and to which constitutional clause it was related. These 
decisions called for a previous determination as to the moment in which the U.S. Con-
stitution admits the existence of personhood in law. In this sense, the Court asserted 
that: 
The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a “person” within the language 
and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . If this suggestion of personhood is es-
tablished, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then 
be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.7
The majority solved this interpretative question by denying the fetus´s person-
hood on the basis of semantic, syntactic and historical arguments. From both the se-
mantic and the syntactic points of view, it was argued that none of the constitutional 
clauses define the meaning of the word “person,” and that each time such word is used, 
it is with reference to human beings that have already been born8. From the histori-
cal point of view, it was stated that at the time that the 14th Amendment was passed, 
and during most of the nineteenth century, state legislation relating to abortion was 
much more permissive than it currently was. This historical fact, combined with the 
presumption that the authors of the Texas legislation under review knew about this le-
gal context, would indicate that the constitutional drafters had no intention to include 
the unborn as subject to the rights established in that Amendment9. Relying on these 
arguments, the Court concluded that the term “person,” as used in the Constitution, 
does not apply to the unborn10.
Out of conceptual necessity, the denial of the personhood of the unborn be-
came the denial of the right to life before birth. But this denial did not prevent the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court from recognizing a legitimate state interest in the protection 
of embryonic and fetal life, which was called “potential human life.” Nevertheless, as the 
right to abortion had been recognized as a “preferred freedom” or “fundamental right,” 
the constitutionality of the rules regulating abortion in view of this interest depended 
on whether or not they passed the strict scrutiny test: that is, the requirement that the 
states justify both the compelling nature of the interests at stake and the norms they 
are seeking to promote – i.e., that a compelling state interest exists, as well as the nec-
essary relationship between them11. 
7  Id. at 157. 
8  Id. at 158.
9  Id.
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 159.
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Based on this, the Court recognized the already renowned three-stage balanc-
ing of rights that is comprised of the right of the mother to abort, and the two state 
interests that have been deemed legitimate12. According to this three-stage concept, 
the Court understood that it is only during the third trimester that the state interest in 
the protection of the “potential human life” acquires enough relevance so as to justify 
the criminalization of abortion. 
 B. Balancing the Right to Abortion and the 
State Interest in Potential Human Life 
Regarding our object of interest, Roe´s conceptual inheritance is that legal per-
sonhood is not recognized by constitutional text and practice until birth, but, never-
theless, there is a legitimate state interest in “potential human life” from the moment 
of conception. 
Taking Casey13 as a landmark case in post-Roe case law, the balancing standards 
between the right of the mother to abort and the state interest in potential human life 
were constructed around the following issues: (a) whether states were or were not en-
abled to set forth a legal duty that women perform fetal viability tests prior to the abor-
tive proceedings that were carried out during the second trimester; (b) what was the 
constitutionally admissible content of informed consent prior to abortive proceedings, 
and who had to provide it; and (c) whether or not the states were enabled to promote 
their interest in potential human life by means other than prohibiting abortion during 
the first two trimesters. 
Regarding the issue of compulsory fetal viability exams, the Court issued 
contradictory statements, first banishing them and then opening the way to them14. 
With varied grounds and a crucially tight majority, the Court cleared the way in Webster, 
affirming that state regulations could establish compulsory pre-procedure medical 
viability tests independent from the trimester in which the tests were ordered, under 
the sole condition that viability was possible according to ordinary medical criteria and 
the exams did not pose a risk to the mother’s health15.
As to the content of informed consent, the Court found that any state regulations 
aimed at deterring the mother from her decision to abort rather than informing her 
about the risks involved in an abortion proceeding were contrary to the Constitution. 
12  Id. at 163-64.
13  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833.
14  See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 US 52, 63-65 (1976), banishing State intrusion, and 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US 379, 390-97 (1979), allowing it.
15  Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490, 515-21 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., White, J. and 
Kennedy, J.); 526 (concurring opinion of O´Connor, J.); and 538 (concurring opinion of Scalia, J.) (1989). 
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These regulations were deemed to ignore the trimester scheme involved in Roe, and 
were therefore deemed unconstitutional16. 
Finally, in what regards the non-coercive use of the sovereign power, the 
Court held, invariably—although on a tight majority—that the states were not under 
an obligation to assign public funds to provide abortions nor were they under an 
obligation to perform abortive proceedings in public health institutions, even when 
either of those choices implicitly promoted childbirth over abortion17. Along this line 
of thought, it was also held that a state could lawfully establish that human life starts at 
conception in so far as such statement did not have the practical effect of casting aside 
the balancing trimester schema18. 
To sum up, as it was pointed out in the plurality opinion in Webster, the Court 
had progressively become a kind of medical committee, assisted by legislative powers, 
regarding the most varied implications of abortive proceedings: establishing how long 
of a waiting period prior to abortion procedures the law should set; what issues had to 
be included in the informed consent and which were to be excluded; who could provide 
the informed consent; when was it legitimate to conclude that the fetus was viable and 
when was it legitimate to conclude it was not viable; what the consequences were; etc.19
Along this process, the function of the Roe tripartite schema became blurred 
and increasingly murky. It was expected that it would provide clear and precise criteria 
regarding the way in which the state’s interests and the case law-based rights of the 
mother to abort were to be balanced; however, only case law dealing with informed 
consent stands as a seamless application of the schema. The remainder of the ques-
tions posed before the Court only succeeded in stretching the strings to the breaking 
point, as was highlighted particularly in Webster, in which four judges issued a dissent-
ing opinion,20 but no explicit majority was reached because there were not five judges 
reaffirming or holding the constitutional validity of Roe. 
In addition to all this, the decisions of the Court were almost always made, as in 
Roe, with an extremely narrow majority that remained united at the level of the judg-
ment, but at variance when it came to providing the reasoning for the decisions. Dis-
parate grounds and miniscule majorities resulted in an unsurprisingly complex set of 
rules that offered, to the law community in general, and the states’ highest courts in 
16  See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 US (1983), 443-45; later confirmed in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obst. & Gyn., 476 US 747, 762-63 (1986).
17  See Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464, 475-79 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 US 519, 521 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 US 
297, 325 (1980).
18  Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs, 492 US at 513. 
19  Id. at 517-18.
20  Blackmun and Stevens, JJ. issued dissenting opinions, and Brennan and Marshall, JJ. joined Blackmun, J.´s 
opinion.
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particular, confusion instead of clarity. This state of confusion was specifically acknowl-
edged by the majority in Casey,21 and this is why it could be affirmed that the cards 
were, in a way, reshuffled. 
Indeed, in Casey, the Court revised both the tripartite temporal schema and the 
rights and interests balancing criteria. Regarding the schema, it was decided that the 
viability of the fetus outside the mother´s womb, and not the length of the pregnan-
cy (i.e., the third trimester) is what established the point at which the state interest in 
protecting “potential human life” becomes compelling enough to legitimize a ban on 
abortion. Regarding the balancing criteria, it was admitted that, even prior to viabil-
ity, the state interest in protecting and promoting potential human life is important 
enough to the enable the states to legitimately promote said potential human life in 
an active manner, provided that this promotion did not presuppose an obstacle or an 
undue burden on the exercise of the right to abort. On these grounds, and contrary to 
prior decisions, it declared that state measures aimed at discouraging the mother from 
the decision to abort were constitutionally valid.22
 C. Some Conclusions
According to this review, it can be gathered that the value of human life is not 
uniform according to the  United States Supreme Court case law regarding abortion, 
for it varies according to the development stage that the fetus may have reached. Three 
different stages can be individualized. The first would correspond to “non-viable poten-
tial human life,” which starts at conception and lasts until the moment when the fetus 
is viable outside the mother´s womb, with or without artificial assistance. The second 
stage would correspond to “viable potential human life,” and it would start at the be-
ginning of viability outside the mother´s womb, until birth. The third stage is personal 
human life, which starts at birth and ends with natural death. 
Embryos would fit into the first stage, “non-viable potential human life,” and this 
is why they could be classified as an object of a state interest, characterized by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in the following manner:
(a) It is optional for states to promote this state or local interest in potential hu-
man life. 
(b) As a state interest, it is not compelling enough so as to justify the limitation 
of the mother´s right to obtain an abortion, but it is strong enough so as to justify com-
pulsory measures aiming at deterring the decision to abort.
(c) The states can overtly favor the promotion of embryonic life, as long as this 
does not pose an undue burden on the mother´s right to abort prior to the moment of 
fetal viability outside the mother´s womb.
21  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US at 944-51.
22  Id. at 874-76.
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 D. The States´ Case Law on Embryos
The optional status of both the promotion and the determination of the weight 
of the state interest in non-viable potential human life—within the limits established 
by the Court—becomes legally active, at both the federal and state levels, in a fabric 
that is woven with the most diverse criteria regarding the legal status of the embryo. 
That status is defined by the states only on an exceptional basis, as would be the 
case in the state of Louisiana. In the case of the other states, as well as at the federal lev-
el, the status may be inferred from the regulation of different activities that are directly 
or indirectly related to the use or destination given to embryos conceived in vitro. The 
most relevant of these activities are those that have to do with assisted reproduction, 
and with the scientific and technological research that requires using, and possibly dis-
carding, embryos. The embryo’s status will depend, essentially, on the existence, or lack 
thereof, of limitations to embryo discard.
Only the legislation of the state of Louisiana and that of New Mexico establish a 
ban on the sale, destruction or any other process that does not involve embryo implan-
tation for later development. This establishes a duty of care and custody on those clin-
ics in which the embryos were created.23 On the opposite side, states such as California, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and New Jersey expressly establish the duty of 
medical service providers to inform the patient of the possibility of discarding embryos 
that were not implanted. However, these same statutes prohibit the sale or commer-
cialization of the embryos, whatever the final aim.24 Other states, such as Oklahoma, 
take up an ambiguous attitude: even if they only allow for heterologous conception 
when performed with a reproductive aim, they omit establishing the same limitation 
in the field of homologous conception, and also fail to clarify what will be the final 
use of those embryos that, even if conceived for a reproductive purpose, were never 
implanted.25 
At the federal level, ever since the Clinton presidency, a ban has been in place 
on the use of federal funds for the creation of human embryos for research purposes 
or for research in which the human embryos were destroyed, discarded or intention-
ally subjected to a risk of damage or death greater than the risk allowed in research 
involving fetuses inside the uterus (commonly known as the “Dickey Amendment”).26 
23  La. Rev. Stat. § 9:126; N.M. Stat. § 24-9A-[1][g]. For a comparative study of these two statutes, see YANG, Diane 
K. What’s Mine is Mine but What’s Yours Should Also Be Mine: An Analysis of State Statutes that Mandate the 
Implantation of Frozen Preembryos. Journal of Law and Policy, v. 10, p. 587-592, 2002.
24  See CaL. HeaLtH & Safety Code § 125305; CoNN. GeN. Stat. § 19a, 32d-32g; Md. Code eCoN. dev. § 5-2B-10; MaSS. GeN. 
LawS ch. 111L; N.J. Stat. § 26:2 Z-2. 
25  See okLa. Stat. tit. 10, § 555. For a comparative synthesis of states’ legislation concerning assisted fertilization, 
see: <www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm> last access: 12 jul. 2013. 
26  This prohibition was not included in a specific statute concerning scientific research on embryos, but 
was instead included, at the initiative of Senator Jay Dickey, in the Balanced Budget Down Payment Act, I, 
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This limitation was not extended to include  privately funded or state funded, research. 
However, in March 2009, President Obama issued executive order 13505, which re-
moved limitations on the use of federal funds for research on new embryonic stem-cell 
lines.27  
Against this backdrop of complex, intertwined criteria, constitutional case law 
at the state level has basically hinged around the issue of who has the right to decide 
what the use of the non-implanted embryos or pre-embryos will be, and with what 
requirements, when there is no agreements between the parents in this respect. 
 1. Davis v. Davis and Kass v. Kass
The leading case in this matter was Davis v. Davis,28 a famous case settled by 
the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992. It involved the fate of seven embryos that had 
been conceived by in vitro fertilization. At the time when the progenitors divorced, the 
embryos were kept under cryopreservation in the clinic in which the progenitors had 
been given the corresponding treatment. 
Initially, and contrary to the wishes of Mary Sue Davis, one of the progenitors, 
that the embryos be implanted in her uterus, Junior Lewis Davis, the other progenitor, 
wanted them to remain under cryopreservation until he came to a decision regard-
ing their use. By the time the case reached the state Supreme Court, both parties had 
changed their claims. Mary Sue wanted the embryos to be donated to any couple that 
was willing to undergo fertility treatment, insisting on the personal nature (person-
hood) of the embryos. Junior Lewis wanted them to be discarded. Mary Sue´s conten-
tion of embryonic personhood was accepted at the trial court level, explicitly rejected 
by the Court of Appeals, and, eventually, by the state Supreme Court. 
Apart from denying the personal nature of the embryos on the basis of the Roe 
v. Wade ruling, the state Supreme Court also denied that the state interest in “poten-
tial human life,” acknowledged as legitimate and optional for states in Roe v. Wade and 
reaffirmed in Webster, was compelling enough as to settle the issue in favor of the im-
plantation of the embryos. Relying on state precedents, and on civil and criminal law 
regulations regarding the fetus’ status when it is inside the mother´s womb, the Court 
concluded that the State of Tennessee had no adopted interest whatsoever in the “po-
tential human life” of the un-implanted embryos. 
Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128(2), 1.10 Stat. 26, 34 (1996), and reapproved each year until 2009. For a detailed and 
complete description of the federal politics concerning the funding of the use of embryos in scientific research, 
see Monitoring Stem Cell Research. A Report of the President´s Council on Bioethics, Washington D.C., 
January 2004, available at <http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/stemcell/> last access: 17 jul. 2013. 
A chronologic synthesis of American state law concerning stem cell research can be found at <http://lti-blog.
blogspot.com/2009/08/lifting-ban-or-obfuscating-truth-bob.html> last acess:12. jul. 2013. 
27  Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 11, 2009).
28  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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Therefore, the un-implanted embryos were not the object of any state interest 
in potential human life, let alone persons. Even so, the Court conceptualized a new 
category for embryos that placed them in between property and personhood, to which 
a special respect was owed given its potential to become a person. In reality, this in-
termediate category was closer to property than to personhood, for the progenitors´ 
rights on un-implanted embryos were deemed “in the nature of a property interest,” 
and included the right to decide on their disposal.29 
On these grounds, the Court set forth a principle of interpretation, whereby 
whenever there is no agreement between the parties, the courts should decide the 
matter by balancing the opposing interests. Applying this principle to the case, the 
Court set forth the rule in which the interest of one of the parties in obviating father-
hood or motherhood (in this case, the father) is stronger or greater than the interest 
of the opposing party (in this case, the mother) in donating the embryos for future 
implantation. 
Kass v. Kass30 continued the development of state common law in the matter 
of determining the use of un-implanted embryos whenever there is disagreement be-
tween the progenitors. Unlike Davis, here there was a prior written agreement that es-
tablished that if the parties became unable to agree on the use of the un-implanted 
embryos, they would be donated to be used in assisted reproduction scientific research. 
Although this agreement between the clinic and the parties was later ratified 
in the divorce decree, the woman asked that the embryos be implanted in her, against 
the husband`s wish that the agreement be executed. In all of the judicial proceedings, 
the debate hinged on the correct interpretation of the agreement signed between the 
parties and the clinic. 
The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that 
the agreement was clear that in event of disagreement between the parties, the un-im-
planted embryos had to be used for scientific research, and so decreed that the embry-
os (described as pre-zygote) be given for that use.31 
 2. Will as the Ultimate Determiner of the Embryo´s Life Value
The binding nature of the common will of the couple, as expressed in the cove-
nants written by them or as agreed upon between themselves and the clinic, was reaf-
firmed in Litowitz,32 even when there is the subsequent common will of the parties to 
deviate from the agreement.
29  Id at 596.  
30  Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 696 N.E.2d 174, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. 1998).
31  Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 562. 
32  Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
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In this case, what was at stake was the use of embryos that had been conceived 
with the husband’s reproductive material, and an ovule donated to the couple by a 
female third party. The agreement between the Litowitzes and the clinic prescribed 
that, if the embryos were not implanted within five years’ time after their conception, 
the clinic should thaw them; in effect, destroy them. Within a divorce context, and after 
the five-year deadline had expired, both parties communicated their decision that the 
embryos that were still frozen be implanted. The issue between the divorcing parties 
was not whether or not they should be implanted, but rather, in whom. Mrs. Litowitz 
wanted the embryos to be implanted in her, and the ex-husband wanted the embryos 
to be donated to another woman. The Washington state court did not provide a solu-
tion for this problem, for no proof had been produced during the trial to show that the 
embryos were still alive. Even so, the Court ventured to say that, even if their existence 
were proven, their use should be regulated by the terms of the agreement; i.e., they 
should be thawed (destroyed).33
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the female progenitor’s 
contention that the agreement signed by the clinic and both of the progenitors, ac-
cording to which, in case of divorce, the embryos would be implanted at any of the par-
ties’ request, be enforced. This Court relied, among other grounds, on the theory that 
to compel a person to become a father or a mother against his or her will was contrary 
to public policy, even if they had contractually bound themselves to procreate.34 This 
holding was later reapplied by the Iowa Supreme Court In re Marriage of Witten35 and, 
by way of obitur dictum, by a Texas Court of Appeals, in Roman v. Roman.36 
 3. Some Conclusions
(a) Un-implanted embryos are not conceptually persons, either under federal or 
state constitutional case law. Nevertheless, they are considered the object 
of “special respect” because of their potential to become persons, which, al-
though different from the respect owed to personal dignity, must be differ-
entiated from the treatment that is owed to objects of interest or property 
rights.
(b)  The exclusive right of the mother to dispose of the embryo’s life, acknowl-
edged in Roe as a privacy right, only refers to embryos that are already 
implanted in the mother’s womb. It excludes un-implanted embryos, and 
therefore, the mother has no right to obviate the father’s interests to im-
plant or discard embryos that are cryogenically stored. 
33  Id. at 271.
34  A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150 (Mass. 2000). 
35  In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
36  Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.2006).
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(c)  The use of un-implanted embryos is regulated, as a rule, by the progenitors´ 
unanimous decision. 
(d)  In case of disagreement, the written agreement prior to their conception is 
binding, provided that it is unambiguous. 
(e)  However, the agreement lacks binding force regarding embryo implanta-
tion. In this respect, the present and concomitant meeting of minds of both 
progenitors is required, both concerning the fact of implantation and the 
body into which they should be implanted. Therefore, either progenitor 
has “veto power” regarding embryo implantation, be it in the womb of the 
mother or in that of a third party.
(f ) “Special respect” does not mitigate in any way the meeting of minds of the 
progenitors. It is only a relevant interpretative criterion to be used whenev-
er the use of the embryos must be judicially settled, given a disagreement 
between the progenitors, and in the face of a lack of a previous written 
agreement settling the issue. 
(g)   The “special respect” principle does not have enough weight in the “coun-
terbalancing” of interests as to make the embryo implantation compulsory. 
On the contrary, in this counterbalancing, the interest of one party in not 
producing a child is heavier than the interest of the opposing party in ges-
tating the embryo or donating the embryo for implantation. 
III. THE EMBRYO IN ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW 
The Argentine case law on embryos offers a rich range of interpretations that 
seem to be firmly established. Young as this judicial experience may be, this short time 
is not an obstacle to reviewing the decisions issued by the Argentine Supreme Court, 
which is the highest national court in the federal order, as well as those issued by other 
Argentine courts. 
 A. The Argentine Supreme Court (2001-2012): 
Tanus, Portal de Belén and Sánchez37
37  On Mar. 13, 2012, in the leading case F.,A.L (CSJN, “F., A.L. s/ medida autosatisfactiva,” Fallos 259: XLVI (2012)), 
the Argentine Supreme Court issued a decision concerning the women´s legal right to abort in case of rape. 
Although this decision did not openly reject the assertions stated in Portal and Tanus concerning the legal 
personhood of the embryos, it did put in question its practical legal effects. It is therefore very likely that 
the case law era which started with Tanus has come to an end with F.,A.L. The purpose of this study being 
to compare the Argentine and the American case laws from the point of view of their respective coherence 
with the conceptual features of fundamental rights, this comparison only takes into account the era in which 
the former is relevantly different from the latter. That is, the era which ended in F.,A.L and goes from Tanus to 
Sanchez.
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In Tanus38 and Portal de Belén,39 the Argentine Supreme Court determined the 
sense and scope of the constitutional principle of the fundamental right to life in rela-
tion to embryonic life. Both judicial decisions, considered as a whole, give rise to the 
following interpretative rule: this principle is binding in the case of embryos with the 
same scope, as if it were the case of an already-born person, and no differences based 
on its development stage or its viability prospects shall be established.
In Tanus, the majority of the Court affirmed the appealed decision, which had 
authorized the induction of labor of an anencephalic fetus in a public hospital. When 
providing the grounds for the decision, the Court pointed out that, even though the 
authorization to induce labor had been requested in the 20th week of pregnancy, by 
the time the case was to be decided by the Supreme Court, the mother had reached the 
8th month of pregnancy. According to the Court, this temporal difference allowed for 
the differentiation of childbirth by induction of labor, on the one hand, and abortion on 
the other. It was argued that the death of an anencephalic fetus outside the mother’s 
womb, when the stage of extra-uterine viability is reached, is not to be attributed to the 
anticipated labor induction, but to the congenital condition of the fetus.
Therefore, according to the Court, the case didn´t concern the constitutional 
validity of abortion, but the way in which two rights were to be counterbalanced: the 
mother’s right to health, and the anencephalic fetus’s exercise of its right to life and 
to health. Considering that in the eighth month, premature birth would not alter the 
unavoidable death of the child, the Court understood that inducing labor did not alter 
the essential content of the fetus’s right to life or to health.
Leaving aside for the moment its logical validity, it should be noticed that the 
Court´s reasoning asserted that the fundamental right to life is in force from the moment 
of conception under the American Convention for Human Rights, Law 23054, article 
4.1., and under article 2, Law 23849, which affirms the Children’s Rights Convention.40
38  CSJN, “Tanus, Silvia c/ Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires s/ amparo,” Fallos 324: 5 (2001).
39  CSJN, “Portal de Belén - Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro c/ Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social de la Nación 
s/amparo,” Fallos 325: 292 (2002).
40  “Tanus”, supra note 38, at cons. 11°. Art. 4 of the American Convention for Human Rights states: “Right to life. 
1. Every person has a right to her life being respected. This right shall be granted by Law and, in general, from 
the moment of conception. Nobody shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (the translation is ours). In Spanish: 
“Derecho a la vida. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho a que se respete su vida. Este derecho estará protegido por la 
ley y, en general, a partir del momento de la concepción. Nadie puede ser privado de la vida arbitrariamente” (Ley 
No. 23054, B.O. del 27/2/1984). Article 2 of Law 23849 states: “When ratifying the Convention, the following 
reserves and declarations shall be stated: (…) In relation to article 1 of the Convention, the Argentine Republic 
declares that it shall be interpreted in the sense that the term “child” is understood to refer to all human being 
from the moment of conception and until eighteen years old” (The translation is ours). In Spanish: “Al ratificar 
la Convención, deberán formularse las siguientes reservas y declaraciones: (…) Con relación al artículo 1º de la 
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño, la República Argentina declara que el mismo debe interpretarse en el 
sentido que se entiende por niño todo ser humano desde el moment de su concepción y hasta los 18 años de edad” 
(Ley No. 23849, B.O. del 22/11/1990).
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In Portal de Belén, the Court reaffirmed this normative interpretation, further 
specifying that conception takes place at the moment of fertilization. In stating this, the 
Court relied on the opinion of different geneticists and biologists that “it is a scientific 
fact that the ‘genetic construction’ of the person is there [at the time of conception], all 
set and ready to be biologically aimed, because ‘the egg’s’ (zygote’s) DNA contains the 
anticipated description of all the ontogenesis in its tiniest details.”41 
From a factual point of view, the Court considered it proven that a contracep-
tive, the marketing and distribution of which had been authorized by the national Min-
istry of Health and Social Action, could operate under three subsidiary mechanisms. 
Contraception could: (i) prevent ovulation, or (ii) operate as a spermicide. Neither of 
these mechanisms posed a constitutional objection from the point of view of the em-
bryo’s right to life. In a subsidiary manner, for the cases in which these two mechanisms 
had not been successfully activated, the contraceptive challenged in Portal would op-
erate by (iii) modifying the endometrial tissue and preventing embryo implantation. 
The Court found that this subsidiary mechanism violated the embryo´s right to life.42 
Therefore, on the basis of these normative and factual premises, the Supreme 
Court revoked the appellate court’s decision, which considered it lawful for the Nation-
al Ministry of Health and Social Action to authorize the marketing and distribution of 
the contraceptive under challenge.
After these decisions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the personhood of the 
nasciturus in Sánchez,43 leaving aside any considerations related to the specific abor-
tion hypothesis. When acknowledging the personhood, the Supreme Court qualified 
the unborn involved in the case as “a person ‘to be born’, this is to say, one of the juridical 
species of the ‘person genus’ under our civil law . . . .”44
 B. Some Conclusions
The principles and rules acknowledged and established in both rulings regard-
ing the legal status of the embryo could be summarized as follows:
(a)  Legal personhood is acknowledged, under Argentine constitutional law, 
from the moment of conception.
(b)  Conception is deemed to happen at the moment of fertilization. 
41 “Portal de Belén”, supra note 39, at cons. 7°.
42  Id. at cons. 9° and 10°.
43  CSJN, “Sánchez, Elvira Berta c/ M° JyDDHH – art. 6° L. 24411 (resol. 409/01),” Fallos 330: 2304 (2007), in which 
the Court provided a reminder that article 30 of the Argentine Civil Code defines as “persons” all beings capable 
of acquiring rights and contracting debts, and art. 63 extend the concept of person to all unborn human 
beings who are conceived in the mother´s womb. Literally: “[E]l art. 30 del Código Civil define como personas 
a todos los entes susceptibles de adquirir derechos, o contraer obligaciones; mientras que el art. 63 señala como 
especie del género “persona” a las “personas por nacer”, definiéndolas como aquellas que, no habiendo nacido, 
están concebidas en el seno materno.” (cons. 9°).  
44  Id. cons. 11°.
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(c)  Any action aimed at interrupting embryotic development after the mo-
ment fertilization occurs should be banned, even when this interruption is 
merely eventual or probable.
(d)  Therefore, the scientific debate regarding the distinction between pre-em-
bryos and embryos, or between viable embryos and non-viable embryos, 
lacks legal significance.
 C. Other Courts of Law and the Embryo
The case law of other courts regarding the legal status of the embryo has pri-
marily hinged on the debate over two different series of issues: one is whether local 
birth control policies were constitutional, and  the other on establishing the use that 
should be assigned to frozen embryos created during fertilization procedures. The legal 
context on which both debates are centered involves, primarily, local and federal stat-
utes regulating sex and reproductive health. Let us review that debate.
 1. Birth Control Questions
The trend to regulate the fundamental or constitutional right to health, espe-
cially as related to sexual and reproductive health, at the local or provincial (state) level 
started in the 1990s and has continued to grow ever since. Therefore, it is a process 
that started some years before the 1994 constitutional amendment, and at least a de-
cade before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Portal de Belén case regarding 
whether the birth control policies allowing the disruption of implantation, or abortive 
methods in general, were constitutional. 
Nevertheless, all statutes issued before and after the 1994 constitutional amend-
ment made the medical prescription and provision of contraceptives dependent on the 
condition of their non-abortive effect. The same condition is set forth in national Law 
25673, promulgated in 2002.45 Although this law is automatically applicable to health 
services subject to the federal jurisdiction of the National Ministry of Health, it also em-
powers the provinces to join the health program created by it.. Thus, be it effected di-
rectly or indirectly, local regulation of sexual and reproductive health includes a general 
ban on abortive methods of family planning.
Notwithstanding this ban, some of these norms, or the regulations issued under 
them, allow contraceptive methods regardless of the distinction between those which 
operate by inhibiting fertilization and those which potentially inhibit the implantation 
of the fertilized egg. 
This lack of normative precision was subject to judicial debate on different occa-
sions after Portal de Belén. A conclusion that can be drawn from this limited, and young, 
case law corpus, is that the debate, at the local or provincial level, does not revolve 
45  Ley No. 25673, art. 6°, B.O. 30032 (Oct. 22, 2002).
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around embryotic personhood–an aspect that is never challenged–but rather on the 
precisions regarding how to adequately weigh it against the mother´s right to repro-
ductive health. Primarily, the debate is centered around the normative consequences of 
the scientific debate regarding the anti-implantation mechanism assigned to emergen-
cy contraception and to the intra-uterine device, or to any contraceptive that happened 
to operate, or could operate, by obstructing the embryo’s development. Regarding this 
issue, the different opinions are detailed in the following paragraphs. 
 2. A First Look at Portal: All “Emergency” 
Contraceptives are Held Abortive
In Asociación Civil Familia y Vida,46 a provincial court of San Luis held that articles 
1 and 2(c) of provincial Law No. 5344 regulating sexual and reproductive health, and 
article 4 of its regulatory decree 127/2003, were contrary to the Constitution. The first 
norm states that “the province of San Luis, by means of the Ministry of Health, shall 
provide to the inhabitants who apply for it, information, assistance and guidance for 
responsible parenthood, in order to secure and guarantee the human right to decide 
freely and responsibly about reproductive patterns and family planning”.47 The second 
establishes that medical providers in public health assistance institutions should pre-
scribe and provide contraceptive methods.48
The local Court understood that this normative plexus was contrary to the Con-
stitution because it failed to expressly exclude the specific contraceptives that forestall 
implantation from the generic provincial duty of prescribing, providing and inserting 
contraceptives at public health facilities.49 As grounds for this argument, the local Court 
relied on the rule, ostensibly established in Portal de Belén, in which any post-coital or 
emergency contraceptive method is to be deemed abortive.50
 3. A Second Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine 
Principle in Favor of the Embryo´s Right to Life  
Similar to San Luis Law 5344, Córdoba Law 9073 establishes and regulates the 
so-called “Responsible Motherhood and Fatherhood Program,”51 generically making 
the prescription and delivery of contraceptives at health assistance centers depend 
on their non-abortive effect. However, Law 9073 differs from Law 5344 because the 
former excludes from the compulsory list of allowed contraceptives both emergency 
46  Cámara Civil, Comercial, Minas y Laboral Nº 2 de San Luis, “Familia y Vida Asociación Civil c/ Estado Provincial 
s/ amparo”, Expte No. 18-F-2002, del 21/3/2005.
47  Ley No. 5344, art. 1° (Prov. de San Luis, Oct. 30, 2002).
48  Dto. 127/03, art. 4° (Prov. de San Luis, Jan. 21, 2003).
49  “Familia y Vida Asociación Civil”, supra note 46, at cons. 3.3.
50  Id. 
51  “Programa de maternidad y paternidad responsables”, Ley No. 9073 (Prov. de Córdoba, Dec. 18, 2002). 
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contraceptives and the intra-uterine device.52 And even if article 7 of Law 9073 allows 
enforcement officers to add new methods of contraception, it expressively states that 
these methods should coincide with those previously approved of by competent na-
tional authorities.
 It was thus not the local statute, but the way in which it was enforced by the 
Executive Power, which included the free delivery of the so-called emergency contra-
ceptives at public health assistance centers, that posed a constitutional problem.53 
The local Court found this enforcement illegal and unconstitutional. Its illegality was 
grounded precisely on the inconsistency between the de facto application and Law 
9073, article 6. Its unconstitutionality was based almost exclusively on the principles 
and rules established by the Argentine Supreme Court in Portal de Belén, showing a 
partially different interpretation from that of the San Luis Court of appeals. 
The main difference between the two holdings lies on the reasons for and the 
scope given to the rule by which emergency contraception should be prohibited due to 
its abortive effect. As stated above, according to the San Luis Court of Appeals, the fed-
eral Supreme Court was said to have established, in Portal de Belén, a kind of iure et de 
iure presumption that every post-coital contraceptive operates via an anti-implantation 
mechanism. The Córdoba court, on the other hand, is slightly more cautious. It does not 
deny the scientific debate regarding the moment of implantation, nor does it consider 
that Portal de Belén has definitively solved its legal relevance. Rather, it establishes that 
the existence of scientific doubt over the moment of fertilization is a sufficient reason to 
justify the ban on emergency contraception, and it does so by applying the pro homine 
principle.54  
 4. A Third Look at Portal: Applying the pro homine Principle 
in Favor of the Woman´s Right to Reproductive Health
Holding a contrary view, other Justices have interpreted that the pro homine 
principle should be applied in favor of the woman´s right to reproductive health, and, 
therefore, it should be unequivocally determined that an emergency contraceptive 
method has an abortive or anti-implantation nature in order to justify its prohibition.55 
Some other Justices have only required “sufficient proof” that the method’s operation 
52  Id. at art. 6.
53  Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de 1a. Nominación, sentencia no. 93, “Mujeres por la Vida 
- Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro —filial Córdoba— c/ Superior Gobierno de la Provincia de Córdoba s/ 
amparo – Recurso de apelación”, Expte No. 1270503/36, del 7/8/2008 (Majority: Justices Mario Sarsfield Novillo 
and Mario R. Lescano. Minority (denying the injunction): Justice Julio C. Sánchez Torres).
54  See opinion of Justice Sarsfield Novillo, who confirmed the majority’s opinion, id. at cons. 11°. 
55  Juzgado de 1ra. Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial de 5ta. nominación de Rosario, “Mayoraz, Nicolás Fernando 
c/ Municipalidad de Rosario”, Expte. No. 1455/02 del 18/06/08, cons. V.
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obstructs implantation in the specific case in which is prescribed, which does not nec-
essarily amount to certainty.56
 D. Embryo Status in the Debate Regarding 
in vitro Fertilization Techniques
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme Court has not 
yet delivered an opinion on whether assisted human reproduction techniques which, 
directly or indirectly, lead to embryo discard—i.e., embryo destruction—are constitu-
tional. Even though many bills57 have been proposed, the issue has not, to date, been 
regulated by statutory Law. Nevertheless, the issue has been debated and resolved in 
the judicial realm in different instances.
 1. Rabinovich 
The first, and most well-known, judicial decision was issued in Rabinovich58 by 
the Civil Court of Appeals located in the city of Buenos Aires. The case involved a series 
of measures aiming at enforcing the right to life and health of embryos which, up to the 
moment the judicial decision was issued, were held under cryopreservation by public 
or private health institutions in the aforementioned city. The judicial decision, issued 
unanimously, was grounded in reasoning that was analogous, though not identical, to 
that adopted two years later by the federal Supreme Court in Tanus and Portal de Belén. 
First, it was found that, from the point of view of Argentine law, personal life 
starts at conception; this determination was based on a systematic reading of all of 
the International Human Rights Treaties and Conventions that take constitutional 
precedence under article 75.22 of the Argentine Constitution. It was also found that 
the principle set forth in article 51 of the Argentine Civil Code,59 according to which a 
person is every entity that may show characteristic human features, has constitutional 
value. 
56  See opinion of Justice Sánchez Torres in “Mujeres por la Vida”, supra note 53, at cons. 15°. Some Courts 
dismissed on formal grounds challenges to the constitutionality of decisions regarding sexual health and 
reproduction from the point of view of the embryo´s right to life. See CSJN, “Morales, Rosa Nélida s/ aborto en 
Moreno” Causa no. 2785, Fallos 319: 3010 (1996); CSJN, “P., F. V. s/ amparo”, Fallos 328: 339 (2005) (authorization 
to induce the labor of an anencephalic fetus).  In another case it was ordered that an intra-uterine device be 
inserted in a minor child, absolutely regardless of the question of its anti-implantation or abortive effects. See 
Cámara de Apelación en lo Civil y Comercial–Sala I- La Matanza, “P. C. S. y C., L. A. s/ fuga del hogar”, Expte. No. 
167 / 1 Res. Def. No. 4/1, del 18/12/2001.  
57  As an example, see file No. 4423-D-2010, Trámite Parlamentario 080 (22/06/2010), Régimen de Reproducción 
Humana Asistida y de Crio conservación (Assisted Human Reproduction and Cryopreservation Regime), 
registered by Silvana M. Giudici, Silvia Storni, Agustín A. Portela and Juan P. Tunessi.
58  CNAC, Sala I, “Rabinovich, Ricardo David s/ medidas precautorias”, Expte No. 45882/93, del 3/12/1999.
59  Art. 51, Cod. Civ. states that “[A]ll beings who show signs characteristic of human beings, without any 
distinction as to qualities or accidents, are persons of visible existence.” In Spanish: “Todos los entes que 
presentasen signos característicos de humanidad, sin distinción de cualidades o accidentes, son personas de 
existencia visible.”
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But even though anyone may be considered a person for constitutional 
purposes, the acknowledgement of the  legal status of the embryo requires 
determining the precise moment when the lawful existence of every person starts. In 
order to resolve this issue, the Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires applied article 4.1 of 
the American Convention of Human Rights,60 as the federal Supreme Court would later 
do in Portal de Belén. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, unlike the Supreme Court, 
paid heed to the devaluation of the protection of the no nato that could be seen in 
the expression “in general”, used in this norm. It decided this particular semantic 
incidence by means of a systematic interpretation that integrated this norm with the 
interpretative declaration by Argentina on the occasion of the ratification of Children´s 
Rights Convention, according to which, “child” is defined as any human being as of the 
moment of conception.61 
The Court of Appeals, once again unlike the federal Supreme Court in Portal, 
considered the logical possibility that the declarations and reservations contained in 
international treaties may not have the same hierarchical legal status as the treaty itself. 
This possibility was neutralized by the phrase contained in article 75.22, Argentine 
Constitution, under which the treaties have constitutional value “under their actual 
enforcement conditions” (“en las condiciones de su vigencia”). Under the federal Supreme 
Court precedents, this expression ought to refer to the conditions that effectively 
regulate the State’s obligations at the international level.62 
As in Portal, it was asserted that conception takes place with fertilization. Never-
theless, while in Portal the federal Supreme Court grounded this interpretation almost 
exclusively on the authority of embryonic science, the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
in Rabinovich was based upon a sort of normative slippery slope argument. It stated 
that all arguments which link legal personhood to the emergence of a particular event, 
such as the moment of implantation, or the appearance of the nervous system, or even 
birth, imply that  the law doesn´t recognize an equal value to all human life.63    
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that  the embryo and, eventually, the mono-
zygotic twins that emerge from the splitting of the embryo, possess individual per-
sonhood. The Court also decided the issue of the humanity and the legal personhood 
of the pronuclear oocyte (i.e., an embryo at the stage that precedes the fusion of the 
female and male gametes’ nuclei) in the following way: the oocyte had to be dealt with, 
by law, in the same way as a person, “not by virtue of asserting its personhood . . .  but in 
60  Cited supra note 40.
61  Supra note 40.
62  See “Rabinovich”, supra note 58, at cons. VI, citing CSJN, “Giroldi, Horacio D. y otro s/ recurso de casación - 
causa n° 32/93”, Fallos, 318: 514 (1995).
63  Supra note 58, at cons. VI and VII.
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the light of the doubt that arises from the impossibility to exclude it with certainty. [This 
doubt] . . . at the factual level, compels us to respect its life and integrity, as if it were a 
person, a subject of law enjoying those rights.”64 
 2.  Subsequent Cases
In three cases that arose after Rabinovich, the debate regarding the embryonic 
legal status involved the parents´ claim that the social care institution (“obra social”)65 
they belonged to should cover the costs involved in assisted fertilization treatment.66 
Opinions delivered in these cases can be ranked  incrementally regarding the legal val-
ue of the embryo´s life, as follows:
a) The parents´ right to have in vitro fertilization procedures covered by medical 
insurance is affirmed, fully bypassing the problem of the use of un-implant-
ed embryos;67 or explicitly eluding a decision on embryotic personhood on 
the basis that it would be a religious question, alien to the scope of interven-
tion by the State;68 or else rejecting the abortive nature of any fertilization 
treatment, on the ground that, out of a conceptual necessity, it cannot be 
considered abortive. None of these opinions referred either to the Supreme 
Court precedent in Portal, or to Rabinovich.69 
b) The parents’ ‘right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure covered by 
medical insurance is affirmed, and there is a proposal, but without binding 
force, regarding the possibility of donating the supernumerary or surplus 
embryos for their later implantation, or alternatively, for their therapeutic 
use or experimentation.70
c) The parents´ right to have the in vitro fertilization procedure covered by med-
ical care insurance is affirmed, but it is simultaneously held that legal person-
hood is recognized from the moment of fertilization, and it is ordered that a 
guardian be appointed to safeguard their physical integrity, considering the 
64  Id. at cons. VII.
65  Obras Sociales are health insurance/health care programs that are primarily administered by trade unions 
for the benefit of the union members and their families (although there are other types of obras sociales, 
such as those administered by each Argentine province for workers in the public sector). They are funded by 
compulsory payroll contributions by employees and employers. 
66  Juzg. CAyT N°6 de la C.A.B.A., “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires”, 20/11/07, LL 2008-
A, 148, El Dial AA439C (reaffirmed by the CCAyT de la C.A.B.A.); Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso 
Administrativo de San Nicolás, “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA”, 15/12/08, LL 2009-A, 408; Cámara Federal de Apelaciones 
de Mar del Plata, “Loo, Hernán Alejandro y otra c/ IOMA y otra”, 29/12/08, available at www.cij.gov.ar  (last 
visited Jul. 15, 2013).
67  See “A.M.R. y otros c/ Obra Social”, supra note 66 (opinion of Justice P. López Vergara). 
68  See Cámara de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo de San Nicolás, S.A.F y A.H.A c. IOMA, 15/12/08, 
LL 2009-A, 408, opinión of Justice Schreginger, cons. 5°, joined by Justice Cebey.
69  See “S.A.F y A.H.A c/ IOMA”, supra note 66, at cons. 5° (opinion of Justice Schreginger, joined by Justice Cebey). 
70  See “Loo c/ IOMA”, supra note 66 (opinion of Justice Ferro). 
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precedent in Portal as valid and binding, and joining the opinion delivered 
by the Court in Rabinovich, but not finding that decision binding given the 
different jurisdictions involved, i.e., national and provincial.71
d) The parents´ claim that the infertility treatment be covered by the social care 
plan is rejected on the basis that it represents a clear threat to the supernu-
merary or surplus un-implanted embryos´ right to life, as interpreted after 
the Portal decision.72
IV. A COMPARATIVE SYNTHESIS FROM THE 
TELEOLOGICAL AND SEMANTIC POINT OF VIEW
If there is any value in the orderly review of judicial decisions and the grounds 
for them, this doesn´t rely either on their thoroughness or on their unattainable defin-
itive nature. It relies, instead, on the possibility of drawing comparisons and contrasts 
of both legal practices regarding processes of conceptual construction and determina-
tion, in the light of the claim that fundamental rights are deontological, absolute and/
or unconditional. 
 A.  The “Practical” Legal Value of the Embryo´s Life Compared 
(i) It should be pointed out that U.S. constitutional judicial law in the field of em-
bryonic legal status is much older than the Argentine one. It was only in 2001 that the 
first judicial decision was issued in Argentina, while the first U.S. precedent, which set 
forth the position of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the value of unborn (“potential”) 
human life, was issued in 1973.
(ii) Under the American case law reviewed, the legal value of human life is not 
uniform; it varies according to the stage of development that an unborn human being 
has reached. Such stages do not exist in the Argentine Supreme Court case law, which 
considers that there is a genre (“persons”) that embraces the one “to be born” from 
the moment of conception, and conception occurs on the occasion of fertilization. Not 
distinguishing stages implies that there is a ban on any action knowingly aimed at in-
terrupting, either in an eventual or probable way, the development of the embryo after 
fertilization. 
(iii) Embryos and pre-embryos in American case law fit in the first stage (“non-vi-
able potential human life”) and are subject to state interest, according to the U.S. 
71  Id. (opinion of Justices Tazza and Comparato).  
72  See opinion of Justice Valdez, id. at cons. X and XI, especially cons. XI in fine. After these cases were decided, 
the province of Buenos Aires’ legislature passed Statute 14208, B.O. 26507 (Jan. 3, 2011), regulated by Dto. 
2080/2011, which classified human infertility as a disease, and therefore included in vitro fertilization in the 
so-called  “compulsory medical assistance plan”, according to which both private and public health insurance 
plans should include the treatment as a free service. 
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Supreme Court. This state interest in the protection of human life is independent from 
the interest that the holder of the right to life may have over his or her own life.73 This 
independence is particularly relevant in order to protect the life of citizens that have 
not, as of yet, acquired the ability to express their own interests. 
(iv) The state interest in non-viable potential human life is compelling enough 
as to justify the binding nature of certain measures aimed at discouraging the decision 
to abort, but no other practical effect is attached to it. For, although under U.S. case law, 
un-implanted embryos are said to not be included among property rights, there is no 
restriction governing the progenitors´ will over embryos where even the will of only 
one of the parties is sufficient to legally justify their discard.
(v)  It is unarguable that judicial decisions issued in Argentina recognize more le-
gal value in embryonic life than  those in the U.S., which considers that legal value arises 
only once the time of non-viability is passed. In Argentina, however, even if the limited 
case law corpus in existence shows a generalized acceptance of the general principle 
that embryonic life is personal life before and after implantation, this uniformity disap-
pears when it comes to determining the constitutionality of rules and courses of action 
which imply the potential or actual discarding of embryos.  
(v) In Argentina, the debate over the treatment owed to embryos is primari-
ly focused on the legal effects of fertilization methods that could involve discarding 
embryos, and on the normative consequences of the scientific debate regarding the 
anti-implantation mechanism of the emergency contraceptive and the intrauterine de-
vice, or any other contraceptive that might operate to prevent embryotic implantation. 
73  This principle was applied forty-four years later as grounds for denying a fundamental right to assisted 
suicide, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 521 US 793 (1997). The grounds 
for state interest in human life are discussed in depth, both by those who approve of Roe and those who 
oppose it. Among many others, see WALEN, Alec. The Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to 
the Unborn, Constitutional Comentary, Buffalo, v. 22 p.161, 2005. P. 178; who highlights the way in which 
this claimed interest would threaten the rights stated in Roe for women. See also BOPP, James; COLESON, 
Richard. Judicial Standard of Review and Webster, American Journal of Law & Medicine, Boston, v. 15, 211-, 
1989.p.216. The idea that states hold an interest in human life which is not conceptually linked to personhood 
was particularly developed by DWORKIN, Ronald. Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be 
Overruled, University of Chicago Law Review, Chicago, v. 59, p. 381- 1992.  This idea was then picked up by 
Justice Stevens in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US at 913 n.2; and in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 747. This same conceptual distinction is also present in other constitutional practices, as is shown in the 
famous leading Spanish  case de-criminalizing abortion, T.C., s. no. 53/1985 at FJ5, B.O.E. no. 119, May 18, 1985. 
For an academic discussion of the plausibility of this distinction see certain commentaries on BRADLEY, Gerard 
V. Life´s Dominion: a Review Essay. (book review), Notre Dame Law Review, Notre Dame, v. 69, p. 329-, 1993. 
CAPRON, Alexander Morgan. Philosophy and Theory: Life’s Sacred Value - Common Ground or Battleground? 
Michigan Law Review, Ann Arbor, v. 92, p. 1491-,1994; GREEN, Abner S. Uncommon Ground, George 
Washington Law Review, Washington, D.C. v.62 p.646-650, 1994; KAMM, Frances M. Abortion and the Value of 
Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, (book review).Columbia Law Review, New York, v. 95, p. 160-122, 1995; 
RAKOWSKI, Eric. The Sanctity of Human Life, (book review) Yale Law Journal, New Haven, v. 103, p. 2049-, 1994.
STACY, Tom. Reconciling Reason and Religion: On Dworkin and Religious Freedom. George Washington Law 
Review, Washington, D.C., v. 63, n.1, p.1-75, 1994; and more extensively STITH, Richard. On Death and Dworkin: 
A Critique of his Theory of Inviolability. Maryland Law Review, College Park, v. 56, n. 2, p. 289-383, 1997.
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(vii) The discussion over contraceptive and fertilization methods in Argentina 
assumes—with or without reason, which is not evaluated here—the normative prem-
ise that women have a right of access to them. Courts differ in the way in which they 
weigh this perceived women´s right with the embryo´s right to life, as recognized in 
Portal de Belén, Tanus and Rabinovich. The contraceptive methods debate is centered 
upon the weight and sense of the pro-homine principle. In particular, it concerns how 
much certainty this principle requires regarding the anti-implantation element of these 
methods. Alternatively, this discussion does not arise from the U.S. case law, which, by 
acknowledging the concept of “non-viable potential human life” and by allowing for 
the disposal of the embryo itself, undermines the primary assertion  of that principle. 
 B. The Justificatory and Semantic Postulates Compared
Judicial debates regarding the legal status of the embryo will continue unfold-
ing and getting richer and richer, both on the U.S. and Argentine scenes, as long as the 
social factors that trigger it are present. Still, even at this early stage of development, 
this comparative synthesis makes evident the unfolding of a semantic-anthropologi-
cal debate relating to the most radical conceptual distinction in the world of law: that 
which separates things on the one hand, and persons on the other. 
The question at hand is to whom do we give the distinction of person or subject 
of law, and why. But this question cannot be resolved if there is no previously adopted 
viewpoint in relation to a more abstract and thus more fundamental, semantic debate: 
how are things classified in general in the world and, in particular, in the legal world? 
Are conceptual classifications the result of a reflexive, yet somehow explicit, social de-
bate that the law is destined to adopt, at least as long as there  prior consent exists? 
Are they an interested imposition of a social group that is picked up by the law and 
clothed with its coactive force? Or are they something similar to a representation of 
reality, which emerges before us already classified, if not thoroughly, at least partially? 
Regarding the embryo´s legal personhood, these questions could be restated 
in the following way: Do the constitutional judicial practices here reviewed find the 
personal or un-personal nature of the embryo as the product of some sort of social 
construction, or do they view it as something already given to understanding, as an 
ob-jectum?  Which is the semantic theory implied in the interpretative arguments used 
in both of the practices here reviewed? 
In what follows, we will address these issues by considering three consecutive 
and  intertwined levels of approach: (a) the relation of interpretive arguments to moral 
and anthropological justificatory stances of interpretation (section 1); (b) the seman-
tics grounding these anthropological and moral stances of interpretation (section 2); 
and (c) an evaluation of the coherence between the categorical nature of fundamental 
principles and these semantic approaches to the concept of legal personhood (title V). 
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  1. The Justificatory Perspective of Interpretation Compared 
The main interpretative argument sustaining the denial of legal personhood 
to the unborn in Roe was the contrario sensu argument: if the constitutional text does 
not entitle the unborn to legal personhood, then it should be excluded from this legal 
concept´s system of reference.74 But as it has frequently been noted, this same consti-
tutional text does not mention either the right to abort, or even the right to privacy—of 
which abortion is considered to be a concrete application. Facing the silence of the con-
stitutional text, there was space, at least from a logical point of view, both to recognize 
and to deny legal personhood to the unborn.75  As was noted above, this interpretative 
argument advanced in Roe vs. Wade against the acknowledgement of the legal person-
hood of the unborn was never revisited. All later cases assume, as part of Roe´s holding, 
that all unborn life is not to be considered “personal life” (and not even human life, but 
“potential human life”).76  
The logical ambivalence of the interpretative argument shows that the actual 
reason sustaining the majority´s decision in Roe—and in the subsequent cases which 
assume without discussion that the unborn is not a person according to the Constitu-
tion—is a moral and anthropological conception of the person, which is assumed as 
the obvious, and thus not explicitly stated, justificatory point of constitutional practic-
es. A moral conception according to which the faculty for autonomy grounds the right 
to be treated with “equal respect and consideration,” as assumed in the constitutional 
concept of “privacy.”77 And an anthropological concept of person, by which it is this 
same faculty (autonomy) that distinguishes human beings from other species. 
Although the Argentine Supreme Court in Tanus and Portal had to deal with 
much more explicit texts regarding the legal status of the unborn (recognizing its legal 
personhood and a right to life from the moment of conception), none of these texts 
explicitly states the moment when conception takes place, nor which kind of legal pro-
tection is due to the unborn. Perhaps aiming to profit from the credibility of scientific 
74  See supra notes 8-10. 
75   Regarding the logical ambivalence of the contrario sensu argument see Kalinowski, George.  Introducción 
a la Lógica Jurídica. Traducida por Juan A. Casaubon. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1973. and  vaLLaURI, Luigi 
Lombardi. Corso di filosofía del Diritto, Padova: CEDAM, 1995. p.95-100. Regarding the feeble legal grounds 
for neglecting constitutional personhood for the unborn, see, among others,  LUGOSI, Charles. Conforming to 
the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in the Fourteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence. Issues in Law & Medicine, Chicago, v. 22, p. 119-303, 2006/2007; or RONHEIMMER, Martin. 
Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and the Legal Defense of Life in a Constitutional Democracy: A Constitutionalist 
Approach to the Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, v. 43, p.135-183, 1998. 
p. 158-59. In any case, even some of those who approve of the decision in Roe notice that neglecting the 
constitutional personhood of the unborn is a main dimension of the case´s holding. See BALKIN, Jack M. How 
Genetic Technologies will Transform Roe vs. Wade, Emory Law Journal, Atlanta, v. 56, p. 843-864, 2007. p.845.
76  See supra notes 13-22; 28-36.
77  This teleological assumption was explicitly stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. 
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discourse, the Argentine Supreme Court in Portal based its interpretation concerning 
the moment of conception almost exclusively on geneticists´ findings.78 Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that the American Supreme Court in Roe—and all the other Courts 
which relied upon this decision—utilized  the same scientific concepts and findings, 
and still attributed to them different practical (moral and legal) consequences. 
The availability of these scientific findings for all of the Courts—Argentine and 
North-American—dealing with the embryo´s status shows the Argentine Supreme 
Court decision in Portal was not only grounded in the scientific description of human 
life, but also in the moral concept of “person,” from which this scientific data was inter-
preted. For the main question being posed to all of the Courts was not, “when does ge-
netics situate the appearance of a new human being?”, but rather the anthropological 
and moral question, “when should dignity, and thus legal personhood, be recognized 
in a new human being?” The underlying reason sustaining the majority interpretative 
conclusion in Portal is thus the concrete answer to this question: the reference of the 
concept of dignity is co-extensive with the reference of the concept of human nature, 
independent of the factual possibilities of it being actualized. 
  2. Implied Semantics Theories Compared 
The different legal status granted to the embryo in one constitutional case law 
practice or the other is due not only, nor primarily, to textual differences, but also to the 
use of different moral conceptions of the person as teleological or justificatory stanc-
es of interpretation. Stated in this way, it should be considered if and how the Courts 
link this justificatory stance of interpretation to the semantic meaning of the texts, and 
which are the epistemic and semantic theories implied in the use of these justificatory 
stances. In fact, both questions are closely related.  
Scientific, moral and anthropological approaches to the nature and value of 
human embryos are explicitly passed over in American case law concerning the legal 
status of the embryo. It is as if Wittgenstein´s theory of “language games” had been rad-
ically interpreted and the “legal game” had been taken to be completely alien to other 
“language games” where the concept of personhood was also the object of discussion, 
and particularly, where an insight into an “outside” world seemed to be allowed. 
This aspiration for the autonomy of legal language from other fields of language, 
be it morals or science, discloses at least two semantic assumptions. First, that the jus-
tificatory viewpoint of interpretation is internal to the legal practice, and second, that 
the frame of reference of legal concepts is absolutely determined by their use within 
the practice.  In effect, if the legal concept of personhood bears no relation to the moral 
concept of the person, or even to scientific findings about human life, it seems that the 
78  See supra note 113-22; 28-36.
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legal concept is nothing  more than a product of legal decisions. It is not surprising, 
then, that arguments determining the legal value of the embryo were always grounded 
on the way the Constitution “uses” the concept of person; or on the presumed intention 
of the Constitutional authors when using constitutional concepts; and on the absence 
of precedents recognizing legal personhood in unborn life, and thus, on the fact that 
the concept of legal personhood has not yet been used in reference to the embryo.79 
This semantic assumption, by which the use of legal concepts within the legal 
community is the only criteria for determining its frame of reference, also seems appli-
cable to the concept of “special respect” that is owed to embryos as an intermediate 
category between things and persons. In effect, this concept, introduced to legal prac-
tice in Davis vs. Davis, is not founded upon any insight into the value of human life as 
considered from a natural, metaphysical, or even a conventionally moral point of view. 
It is, instead, exclusively grounded on a kind of extension of other legal concepts, which 
have been used for a longer time. It is like a mix of the concepts of “property,” “born hu-
man life,”, and “unborn but viable human life.”80 And  being a mix of all three, it has nei-
ther the same significance nor, of course, the same legal force, as the third of the three. 
That is why this “special respect” amounts to less than nothing from a practical point of 
view, for if there is a rule concerning the destiny of embryos, it is that they should be 
discarded in case of disagreement between the progenitors. 
Argentine case law is not as uniform as the American one in the degree to which 
the connection is acknowledged between different “language games,” and the seman-
tic theory implied therein. The metaphysical and moral perspectives of interpretation 
do not seem clearly acknowledged in Portal and Tanus, where the legal status of the 
embryo is asserted as a necessary conclusion based on scientific and legal statements.81 
It is plainly stated in Rabinovich, where, in the face of both the textual indeterminacy 
concerning the embryo´s legal status and the fact of scientific discussions concerning 
the moment when a new human being appears, the Court of Appeals based its inter-
pretation of the embryo as a legal person on the moral and legal pro homine principle.82 
In any case, this more or less open recognition that the legal “language game” 
is connected to the scientific and moral ones expresses both the conviction that le-
gal concepts are not purely constructed from the inside of the legal practice, and that 
something exists prior to human social practices and language which claims respect. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is also clear that all of the Argentine 
Courts complemented this attention to the biological and moral nature of a human per-
son with the actual use of the concept itself within the legal practice, when interpreting 
79  See supra notes 8-10.
80  See supra note 30.
81  See supra notes 38-41.
82  See supra notes 58-64.
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the concept of legal personhood. The role of use within the legal practice was particu-
larly relevant when the question was not to determine the definition of legal person-
hood, but rather what the legal consequences of recognizing the entitlement to legal 
personhood are; or how the law should deal with scientific doubts concerning the mo-
ment when fecundation takes place;83 or the way contraceptives operate. These ques-
tions were, in all cases, approached with interpretative rules internal to the Argentine 
legal practice, such as the principle of pro homine.  
As mentioned above, not all Argentine Courts enforced this principle with the 
same consequences. Some of them applied it in favor of the mother´s assumed right 
to conceive children, and others in favor of the life of the embryo. Two related explana-
tions can be advanced for this disagreement. In the first place, the proposition referred 
to by the legal statement “pro homine” is not at all evident or manifest. It is not evident if 
the principle is an appropriate ground for determining who is entitled to its protection, 
nor is it clear who should benefit when its enforcement postpones another person´s 
claimed rights.     
Second, precisely because of this lack of manifestation, its practical significance 
differs according to the concept of justice from which each interpreter determines the 
global and final justificatory point of law. The more this concept of justice is attached 
to privacy and moral autonomy, the less value is attributed to the life of an embryo, 
which corresponds to less entitlement to legal protection. On the contrary, the more 
the concept of justice is attached to dignity as a universal and non-variable claim of 
respect—related to the concept of moral autonomy, but not to be confused with it—
the more value is attributed to embryotic life, resulting in a greater entitlement to legal 
protection.
V. WHICH SEMANTIC THEORY SHOULD 
GOVERN LEGAL PRACTICE?
Two semantic strategies and conceptions underlie the two legal practices com-
pared here: a traditional, or “criterial,” semantics on one side, and a sort of “light”—with 
ample space for social construction—realist semantics on the other. The last question 
to be posed is: which of these is more coherent with the categorical and universal na-
ture of fundamental rights?
The discussions regarding which is the semantic praxis that better fits these fea-
tures of fundamental rights are too ample to be reviewed in this article. However, it 
seems appropriate, at least, to point out that they lead us back to the basic choice that 
was stated above, i.e., either the fundamental rights principles are social constructions 
83  See Rabinovich, supra note 58.
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that precede and determine their own frame of reference; or else their reference—
some basic human good—precedes and determines its meaning.84
If the meaning or concept of fundamental rights is exclusively the product of a 
more or less controlled social construction, and more importantly, if a construed mean-
ing determines its own field of reference, it would be extremely hard to predicate the 
universality and absoluteness of fundamental rights principles. By contrast, their exten-
sion as its categorical or absolute nature would depend upon the will for a social con-
struction of meaning to lead. Some political philosophers supporting this constructive 
approach to fundamental rights principles have openly admitted that it is irreconcilable 
with their categorical and universal nature, particularly when applied to the legal con-
cept of personhood.85 
 Others are much more reticent to admit this openly. Thus, Ronald Dworkin has 
expressly rejected what he deems to be a criterial semantic approach to law, according 
to which all legal concepts—including the concept of law itself—are constructed from 
inside the practice, with no other basis than the sheer fact of a convergence of their 
criteria in use within the practice. Against this claim, Dworkin contends that legal con-
cepts are interpretative and thus there is no need of fundamental convergence in their 
use.86 Additionally, he has pointed out that legal and political concepts are the product 
of a collective constructive practice in the light of moral and political values and, in 
the end, in the light of a substantive conception of what qualifies as a good life. In this 
sense, he aims to distinguish himself not only from classical positivistic approaches to 
law, which claim the neutral nature of the constructive process of legal concepts, but 
also from Rawls’ Theory of Justice, which aspires to exclude “comprehensive concep-
tions” from the constructive process of political values.87 
84  As is well known, the alternative between giving priority to reference over meaning when determining the 
sense of concepts was stated and developed in the field of Philosophy of Language by KRIPKE, Saul. Naming 
and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980; and PUTNAM, Hillary. Meaning and reference. Journal of Philosophy, 
Hanover, v.70, p. 699-711, 1973; These theories were applied to the problem of legal interpretation by MOORE 
Michael S. Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Fordham Law Review, New York, 
v. 59 p. 2087-2117, 2001. p.2091; among other works; and, with some differences, by StavRoPoULoS, Nicos. 
Objectivity in Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996;  and BRINK, David O. Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and 
Morality. In: LEITER, Brian. Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ed.1, 2001. 
p. 12-65. For a critical revision of these theories see BIX, Brian H. Can Theories of Reference and Meaning Solve 
the Problem of Legal Determinacy? Ratio Juris, Oxford, v. 16, p.281-295, 2003. Regarding the limitative role of 
semantics in interpretation out of the English language field, see, e.g., wRÓBLewSkI, Jerzy.  Sentido y hecho en 
el derecho. Tradución: Francisco Javier Ezquiaga Ganuzas e Juan Igartua Salaverría. v.9, series Doctrina Jurídica 
Contemporánea. México: Fontamara 2001. p.108; and ZAMBRANO, Pilar. Los derechos ius-fundamentales 
como alternativa a la violencia. Entre una teoría lingüística objetiva y una teoría objetiva de la justicia. Persona 
y Derecho, Navarra, n. 60, p. 131-152, 2009. 
85  See, e.g., RAWLS, John. Political Liberalism. expanded ed., Columbia Classic in philosophy, 2005.p.20. 
86  See DWORKIN, Ronald. Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1986; supra note 2, at 46; 
DWORKIN, Ronald. Justice in Robes. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2006; supra note 2, at 12, 151. 
87  See DWORKIN, Ronald. Justice in Robes. Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2006; supra note 2, at 160-161, 
225-226.
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Ronald Dworkin’s answer to them both is that all interpretative concepts are the 
product of a holistic constructive practice that synthesizes natural, moral, legal, and 
political concepts. This holistic account seems much more faithful to legal practice than 
the “criterial one.” In effect, as has been shown above, both the Argentine and the Amer-
ican Courts rely on a holistic approach to the concept of legal personhood, no matter 
how much they both try to disguise this fact.  
Now, as we have previously mentioned, it is obvious that criterial semantics im-
plies a negative answer to the question of deference to reality. But the opposite is not 
obvious. For the question is not only to what degree are legal concepts related to moral, 
political or natural concepts, but also, if anything exists prior to the whole conceptu-
al constructive process itself. To this Ronald Dworkin would answer “no,” or better, “it 
doesn´t matter:” the only basis for the whole constructive process is a “reflective equi-
librium” between coherence and conviction.88 But this mix of conviction and coherence 
is all that Dworkin claims for moral objectivism. 
There is no place in his theory—nor any need, according to him—for self-evi-
dent or self-justified practical propositions, or for the claim that these propositions bear 
any relationship with human nature.89 And it should be noted that although self-justi-
fied, practical propositions are generally the object of moral and political convictions, 
this is not always the case or, much more importantly, their epistemic justification.  
Now, without reference to self-justified practical propositions, there is no crit-
ical instance with which to confront the whole conceptual constructive process.90 In-
stead, if reference leads the abstraction of meaning, when legal authorities construe 
intricate and obscure meanings (as, in fact, they have already done in relation to the 
legal concepts of “person” and “special respect”), the reality referred to by these legal 
and moral concepts would make clear that there is abuse in the use of language. For no 
matter how much imperium courts may have to construct and reconstruct concepts in 
the social sphere in general, and in the world of law in particular, they lack the power 
to transform, and least of all to deny, the referential frame of this construction. In other 
words, if reference precedes meaning, then human or fundamental rights principles 
88  Id. at 162.
89  Id. at 226-227, and DWORKIN, Ronald. Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Princeton, v. 25, p. 87-139, 2006.p.118.  
90  Both the possibility of grounding moral and legal objectivity in self-evident practical principles, and the 
possibility of acknowledging a connection between these principles and natural human ends, has constantly 
been defended by the New Natural Law school of thought and, especially in the field of law, by John Finnis. See, 
among many other works, FINNIS, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights. 2 ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011; 
chapters 23-24, and FINNIS, John. Introduction to 1 Natural Law at xi. In: FINNIS, John; DEVER, Carolyn (editors). 
The international library of essays in law & legal theory series. v.1, Dartmouth: Dartmouth Press, 1991. 
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and their characteristic universality—for each and everyone—and absoluteness, in all 
cases, would be invulnerable to the abuses of language.91
Having reached this stage of the discussion, it is worthwhile to ask, one last time: 
which semantic practice better fits the conceptual, and therefore the necessary, char-
acteristics of human rights? A practice that construes concepts from a vacuum, or a 
practice that construes them from a grasp of reality? In this latter case, how does the 
reality referred to by the concept of human rights narrow the construction of the legal 
concept of person? Is it not by imposing the only condition that its admittance be uni-
versal for every man, and absolute in each and every situation? 
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